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LORD Wright while describing Quasi-Con-
tract said: 1Law is bound to provide remed-
ies for unjust enrichment or unjust bene• 
fit, that is, to prevent one from retaining 
the money of, or some benefit, derived 
from, another which is against conscience 
that he should keep. Such remedies in Eng-
lish Law are generally different from those 
in contract or ton, and now fall in a third 
category of Common Law called Quasi· 
Contract or Restitution•. · 
Chitty on Conuacts says that: Prece-
dents deal with diverse situations, but 
they involve a special relationship bet-
ween two persons where the law imposes 
a duty on one to pay a sum of money or 
(exceptionally) to deliver specific property 
to another. The underlying aim of the pre-
cedents seems to be compulsion of the de· 
fendant to make restitution of a benefit 
which he ought not in justice to retain at 
the expense of the plaintiff. A quasi-con• 
tractual situation resembles a contractual 
one in that liability is imposed upon a par-
ticular person co pay money to another, yet 
it differs in that quasi-contractual liabili· 
ty is imposed by law irrespective of_ the 
agreement of the panics. Liability in qua· 
si·contracts is not necessarily based on 
any 'wrong' (tort) committed by the defen• 
danc. 
'Indebitatus assumpsit' which was the 
remedy for breaches of contract in order to 
enforce consensual obligations, became a 
complete alternative to the old writ of debt, 
and inherited the wide scope of debt over 
not only consensual obligation but also 
some obligations classified in modem law 
as quas.i-concractual. 
'Account' came to be used to recover 
money paid under a mistake or money pa.id 
for a consideration which had wholly fail· 
ed. This is like our 'lndebiti Solutio'. 
However, in England, the Common Law 
was not alone in providing a remedy for 
unjustified enrichment. Equity indepen· 
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dently developed some principles which 
are aimed at the same result, viz., to force 
one disgorge property io his possession 
which rightly 'belong' to the plaintiff. Equi-
ty employed two methods: 
1. 'constructive' trust, by which one 
was deemed to be a trustee of the property 
for the plaintiff, so that all the remedies 
of the law of trusts were available to en· 
able the plaintiff as beneficiary co recover 
what was due to him. 
2. By the mechanism of a tracing order, 
property in the wrong hands could be 'fol-
lowed' or 'traced' by the true owner de· 
spite changes or admixture of the proper· 
ty. In U.S.A. these two principles of Com· 
mon Law and equity were amalgamated into 
the topic called 1Restitution '. F.n glish 
lawyers arc now aware of the interrelation 
of law and equity in quasi-contract and 
restitution. 
The theoretical basis of quasi-contract· 
ual liability was for many years controver-
sial. Two main theories are considered: 
1. Unjustified Enrichment; and 
2. Implied Contract Theory. 
I. In 1760 Lord Mansfield called the 
principle of . Unjustified Enrichment 'an 
equitable action to cover back money which 
ought not in justice to be kept'. It lies for 
money which, 'ex aequo et bono', the de· 
fendant ought to refund; this lies for money 
paid by mistake, or upon a consideration 
which happens co fail or for money goc 
through imposition or extortion, or oppres-
sion; or an undue advantage taken of the 
plaintiff's situation. 'The defendant, up· 
on the circumstances of the case is oblig· 
ed by the ties of natural justice and equity 
to refund the money'. The equity here re-
ferred to is the tius naturale' of the Roman 
Law, that is, Natural Justice. 
The 'unjust benefit' theory has been 
criticised on the ground that the test of 
natural justice is too vague. But there is 
dready a considerable body of case law 
.ealing with categories of quasi-contract, 
. nd judges follow the existing precedents, 
rhich cover most of the likely problems of 
~estitution. 
Goff & Jones, authors of 'Restitution in 
~nglish Law', accept the principle of un-
ust enrichment. They say that che law 
olds that: it is unjust to allow the defen-
lant to retain a benefit received at the 
·laintiff's expense e.g. 'the benefit must 
ot have been conferred officiously or con-
erred in submission to an honest claim, 
.or "as an out-and out gift"'. Restitution 
rill not be awarded if such an award would 
ead to the indirect enforcement of a tran-
action which the Jaw refuses to enforce; 
estitution will not be awarded to enable 
rie to make a profit out of his own wrong. 
he claimant muse put the other patty back 
1to his original position. It is submitted, 
owever, that the 'unjust benefit' theory 
)ould be regarded as the correct theoreti-
al principle of Restitution and of quasi-
)lltractual liability, since the alternative 
::iw to be considered, is obviously inade-
1ate. 
2. The Implied Contract Theory derives 
om the fact that previously a contractual 
~medy had been used to obtain restitution 
f money had and received, but in that ae-
on (indebitatus assumpsit) there was the 
otion of a promise to pay. This section 
a:; abrogated in 1852 Common Law Pro-
~dure Act. 
This theory, however, is greatly criti-
_sed because it fails to show in what cir-
umstances the law imposes Quasi-con-
actual Liability. 
In English Case Law there seems to be 
classification of actio'!s between: 
1. 'RESTITUTION', where the defendant is 
,liged to restore or pay for a benefit re-
~ived from the plaintiff, and 'Liability to 
ccount to Plaintiff' for money received 
om a third party. As will be seen in the 
:':Xt paragraph 'Restitution' and our 'Ne· 
>tiorum Gestio' are similar. 
2. 'REIMBURSEMENT' where the defen-
ant is obliged to repay the plaintiff the 
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money paid by the plaintiff to third per-
sons • 
3. 'RECOMPENSE' such as 'Quantum Mer-
uit' for services rendered. 
4. 'ACCOUNTS STATED\ 
These four acti612s will now be dealt with 
in detail. The FIRST is the ACTION FOR MO-
NEY HAD AND RECEIVED BY THE DEFENDANT TO 
THE PLAINTIFF'S USE, i.e. RESTITUTION: 
This is an action for money had and re-
ceived by the defendant to the use of the 
plaintiff when the plaintiff has paid money 
to the defendant under certain specified 
circumstances. The cases for Restitution 
include: 
(a) An action for recovery of money- paid 
under a MISTAKE OF FACT which must be 
basic. This must include sheer ignorance 
of something relevant to the transaction. 
A case decided so, is: NORWICH UNION FIRE 
INSURANCE SOCIETY LTD. V. WILLIAM H. PRICE 
LTD. But, money paid in discharge of a le-
gal obligation is not recoverable even if 
paid by mistake. 
(b) Payment under a MIST AKE OF LAW is 
us_ually not .recoverable. But if there is 
something more than a mi stake of law, 
(and there usually is), it is recoverable. In 
'HOLT v. MARKHAM' payment wa~ refused. 
Mistake of Common Law and Equity also 
falls here. 
(c) A MISTAKE OF GENERAL LAW in con-
struction of a written document is consi-
dered a mistake of law. 
There is an exception to the rule that a 
mistake of law prevents recovery and this is 
where a part of an estate has been distri-
buted according to a void testamentary 
disposition. Again, recovery is missable 
where payment is made under contract but 
under a mistake of law, and neither party 
knew that the payment was illegal. But 
any fraud, oppression or undue influence 
gives rise to restitution even if made un-
der a mistake of law. 
In ' AIKEN v. SHORT' it was held that for 
restitution the mistake of fact must be one, 
which if true, would have made the person 
liable to pay the money and not ~erely one 
which would make it desirable that be 
should pay. But in 'KERRISON v. GLYN 
MILLS, CURRIE • Co.' recovery was allow· 
ed although the mistake, had it been true, 
would not give rise to an obligation to 
pay. 
'LARNER v. L.C.C.' indicates that recov-
ery is permitted where the mistake of fact 
is fundamental or essential, and that a mis-
take may be such, even if the supposed 
fact were true, there would be no legal ob· 
ligation to make payment. 
(d) NEGLIGENCE to see if payment is ac• 
tually due does not prevent recovery. But 
recovery is not admissable if the payee by 
his words and intention induced the payer 
to act on the belief of the facts represent· 
ed to him. An ESTOPPEL will cause the ac-
tion for recovery to cease, and this is a 
clear case when recovery is not permitted. 
Besides these, some writers also include 
as circumstances which qualify under the 
heading of Restitution: a consideration 
which bas wholly failed, and Extortion. 
In the former, absence of consideration 
is not enough - so, money paid by way of 
gift, cannot be recovered. But money paid 
in consideration of the sale and delivery of 
goods can be recovered if by reason of 
1lon·delivery of the goods there is a total 
failure of the consideration for which the 
money was paid. 
In case of Duress, which may be both 
physical or moral, and Extortion, the money 
which is paid, is paid under pressure and is 
not paid voluntarily. Similarly, that paid 
in discharge of an illegal demand made 
'colore officii', or under pressure or coer· 
cion, can be recovered back as not paid 
volontarily. A mere threat to do what the 
person threatening is free in law to do 
cannot amount to sufficient coercion. But 
some Commonwealth Court decisions hold 
that a threatened breach of contract is 
'practical compulsion', and the victim is 
allowed to recover. 
Also included under this action for Res• 
titution is 'Liability to Account to Plain-
tiffs for Money Received from a Thir~ Par· 
ty'. 
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The SECOND is: ACTIONS FOR MONEY PAID 
BY THE PLAINTIFF TO THE DEFENDANT'S USE, 
i. e. REIMBURSEMENT: 
This is an action for money paid where 
the plaintiff has under compulsion of law 
paid mone~· which the defendant was ul-
timately liable to pay so that the latter ob-
tains the benefit of the payment by the dis-
charge of liability. 
In certain situations two persons may be 
subject to a common legal liability to a 
third person, but as between themselves 
one is primarily and the other only second· 
arily liable to discharge it. If the person 
secondarily liable pays off the third per· 
son, and thereby discharges the common 
liability, he may recover the amount paid 
from the person who is ultimately liable. 
Sutton & Shannon give this example: If 
A leaves his goods on the premises of a 
lessee, with the latter's authority, and they 
are then d.istrained by the landlord for non-
payment by the lessee of his rent, so chat 
A is legally compelled to pay the rent in 
order to reco"ler his goods, he can after· 
wards sue the lessee for the amount paid. 
Again, where a local authority has a right 
to demand that a liability be met by either 
two persons, for instance, to require either 
a landlord or a tenant to repair drains, 
then, if the person who is compelled to pay 
is not responsible as between the two of 
them, he can recover from the other. Here, 
one has to show that the defendant was 
subject to a demand in respect of the same 
liability as the plaintiff. 
The THIRD action: is that on a QUANTUM 
MERUIT CLAIM, i.e. RECOMPENSE. 
Where the defendant is obliged to pay 
the plaintiff, e.g. for work done, but no spe· 
cific sum is owing, the plaintiff can re· 
cover a reasonable sum. Treitel in his 
' Law of Contract' says: 'A party can claim 
Quantum Meruit for work or goods under a 
contract which does not provide a specific 
price, and where the agreement 1s implied'. 
Later, he generalises in the words: 'If the 
plaintiff has a legal right to be paid the 
Court will award a sum '. Most writers quote 
the following illustration: wh~re a purchas· 
er has bou8ht goods by weight and, owing to 
a mistake in weighing, has paid for a larg· 
er quantity than he has received, he can 
recover the over-payment in quasi-contract. 
One who has done work under a contract 
which is void may be able to obtain pay-
ment by way of quasi-contract, through a 
quantum meruit claim which literally means 
•so much as the thing is worth'. This is 
the right to a reasonable remuneration for 
work done or to a reasonable price for goods 
delivered. It is a quasi-contractual eight 
arising by virtue of the fact that something 
has been done by one party on behalf of 
the other. 
It is remarked by Sutton & Shannon that 
claims on quantum meruit may be either 
quasi-contractual or contractual, aod it is 
at times not dear to which category a par• 
ticular claim should be assigned. 
The FOURTH action is that: UPON AC-
COUNTS STATED: 
An account stated is the admission of a 
sum of money being due from the defendant 
to the plaintiff. !t must be sued upon as a 
distinct cause of action. 
The simplest illustration of an account 
stated is an ordinary 1.0.U. The admission 
implies a promise to pay and the existing 
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debt furnishes the consideration. The ac· 
count stated is not conclusive between the 
parties, and it is always open to the defen-
dant to prove that the account was stated 
(i.e. that he made the admission), by mis· 
take, or that it was respecting debts void 
for want of consideration or for illegality. 
The onus of proof i!l on the defendant; the 
plaintiff need only produce bis 1.0.U. or 
other admissi~n and is entitled to succeed 
unless the defendant brings foward evi-
dence in support of his plea. 
A rather different type of •account stat-
ed, occurs when parties state items on 
both sides of the accounts and strike a ba-
lance. This is a contractual settlement of 
their mutual claims; here there is a pro-
mise to pay the balance given for conside-
ration on the other side and, therefore, ac· 
tion may be brought on the acGount stated 
even if some of the debts were unenforce-
able or statute barred. 
From this ooe clearly sees that the Eng-
lish Courts have tried to solve this prob· 
lem as it arose and have evolved a type of 
classification of actions whereby the per-
son who is prejudiced by another,s unjus· 
tified enrichment can get some remedy. 
